

REDESIGN OF THE NAVAL RESERVE

By RADM Steve Keith, USNR (Ret)

In the September 2004 issue of this magazine, we outlined the Commander Fleet Forces Command Zero-Based Review (ZBR) methodology, assumptions, and analysis process. That overview can be found on our Web site <<http://www.navy-reserve.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=2100>>. At the time we went to press for that issue of the magazine, the Chief of Naval Operations had not been briefed on the results of the ZBR.

In this follow-on article, we will explore what was briefed to the Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, the title for this article came from the cover slide of the brief given by Fleet Forces Command on the results of their ZBR. We do not know definitively what decisions were made by the CNO; but by looking at the FY-06 budget that was submitted by the President to Congress in early February 2005, we can make some educated guesses.

Zero-Based Review Results

The direction from the CNO to CFFC was to “Validate Naval Reserve requirements and determine ability of Naval Reserve to provide required capabilities. Map capabilities to Sea Power 21.” The determination of the ability of the Naval Reserve to provide the required capabilities was part of the validation criteria used.

The ZBR identified Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and Civilian Personnel (CIVPER) billets for the validated functions as follows:


- Net decrease 16,018 RC billets (divest 20,200; create 4,202)
- Net increase 882 AC billets (divest 1,741; create 2,623)
- Net increase 450 Civ billets (shift from 2,663 of 20,200 RC)
- Total decrease 14,686 Total Force billets

This is a good news, bad news story. The good news is that 62,280 Naval Reserve billets were validated to support Navy’s Sea Power 21 Strategy and meet DoD post 9/11 guidance. And, there were 7,000 Naval Reserve billets that weren’t looked at (4,000 Joint-funded Navy billets and 3,000 Full-Time Support billets) that, when added in, bring the billet total to 69,280. The FY-06 budget requests 73,100; and the FY-07 shows 71,200.

The seemingly bad news is that there is a decrease of 16,018 billets. Some of those reductions resulted from the Naval Reserve not being able to recruit to the authorized levels in certain communities (e.g., medical). The resources sponsors bought billets that they received no benefit from; and, in this review they had a good opportunity to correct the situation. And, in full disclosure, Naval Reservists were brought into the program for the wrong reasons – to meet Congressionally authorized end-strength. From any perspective (resource sponsor, manpower claimant, taxpayer), these type adjustments are the right thing to do. What RADM Dave Anderson told last July comes to mind: that his personal goal in accepting the ZBR assignment was “for every Naval Reservist to have a meaningful assignment in the future of our Navy.” As a result of this effort, we’re getting closer to that vision.

Another factor to consider in the decrease is the ability of the Navy (Active and Reserve recruiting have been combined into one) to recruit to the requirements and for the Commander Naval Reserve Force to retain them. It is challenging to recruit Reservists when you tell them that they will be recalled to active duty for a year every fourth or fifth year – the contract has changed in so many ways!

It is also challenging to retain individuals with ever increasing demands on their time and the uncertainty of their future. The case of our former National VP for



Public Affairs, LT Ian King, comes to mind. He was not selected for a billet in the PAO program and ended up in the VTU. This is an officer who served VADM Weaver in the Navy Yard when he was Commandant, Naval District Washington and also served in the immediate office of the Secretary of the Navy, working for CAPT Wensing. The advice that he got from a senior Naval Reserve officer in his community was something along the lines of “that’s OK, everyone sooner or later does time in the VTU.” That is not the advice LT King was looking for. He has since concluded that if he was not competitive to be selected for an assignment as a LT, then he would be less competitive for promotion because his peers are doing more meaningful work. Unfortunately for us and the Navy, he is in the process of resigning his commission. I have been told that there is a slight increase in the percent of officers and enlisted personnel leaving the Naval Reserve of late.

The graphic on the right summarizes by activity the results of the ZBR. It is taken from the Power Point brief (given to the CNO); and it gives you the ZBR numbers, a sample explanation of the changes at three activities (NAVELSF, C2F, C3F), and a graphic of the net decrease (remember to add back the 7,000 billets). Here’s what I have gathered about some of the findings:

- o BUMED – Bureau of Medicine – a fleet hospital was eliminated because it was never manned.

- o COMSC – Military Sealift Command – realizes that the MPS ships that they send forward will need armed guards in port. Force protection teams are being stood up and trained as we speak.

- o SUBFOR – Submarine Force – majority of billet loss is associated with a decision not to provide manning for an aging submarine tender in the mothballed fleet on the James River.

- o CNI – Naval Installations – elimination of most nonmilitary support functions (e.g., galley, berthing) at Naval bases throughout the country.

- o SPECWAR – Special Warfare – increase in the number of Reservists who can make significant contributions in the Global War on Terrorism.

- o NAVSECGRU – Security Group – increase in the number of Reservists who also make significant contributions in the Global War on Terrorism.

- o SPAWAR – Space and Naval Warfare – decided that Peacetime Contributory Support performed by SELRES who went aboard ships to verify their C4ISR equipment will now be done by contractor – it is not military essential.

- o NAVSEA – Sea Systems Command – with present onboard civilian and active duty military personnel, there

ZBR Results

| 37 Packages (Activity Inputs) | # of Functions | Current (Nov 03 TFMMS) | Proposed | ZBR | Billet Change |
|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------|--------|---------------|
| CONFORCOM | 3 | 11,455 | 11,049 | 11,049 | (406) |
| CNAF | 28 | 11,157 | 8,843 | 8,415 | (2,742) |
| CNSF | 64 | 9,789 | 8,027 | 7,687 | (2,102) |
| BUMED | 7 | 7,810 | 5,619 | 5,569 | (2,241) |
| COMNAVRESFOR | 6 | 4,409 | 4,440 | 4,054 | (355) |
| FORCE PROTECTION | 11 | 3,076 | 3,104 | 2,899 | (177) |
| USMC | 4 | 2,375 | 2,352 | 2,352 | (23) |
| NAVELSF | 7 | 2,807 | 2,129 | 2,129 | (678) |
| COMSC | 5 | 1,606 | 3,487 | 1,875 | 269 |
| CPF | 71 | 1571 | 1654 | 1,631 | 60 |
| SUBFOR | 21 | 2,669 | 2,742 | 1,564 | (1,105) |
| CNI | 63 | 2769 | 2965 | 1,533 | (1,236) |
| SPECWAR | 18 | 960 | 1,382 | 1,382 | 422 |
| NAVSECGRU | 8 | 950 | 1,150 | 1,106 | 156 |
| C2F C3F | 15 | 1,554 | 1,091 | 1,091 | (463) |
| CHNAVPER | 13 | 1,271 | 1,238 | 1,050 | (221) |
| NAVSUP | 83 | 1,514 | 1,008 | 1,008 | (506) |
| ONI | 8 | 781 | 789 | 768 | (13) |
| NETWARCOM | 19 | 843 | 845 | 751 | (92) |
| NAVCENT | 34 | 810 | 1,434 | 676 | (134) |
| NAVEUR | 11 | 784 | 653 | 645 | (139) |
| NETC | 26 | 990 | 778 | 448 | (542) |
| CHINFO | 4 | 340 | 387 | 340 | 0 |
| FFC | 18 | 427 | 334 | 334 | (93) |
| SPAWAR | 23 | 588 | 576 | 323 | (265) |
| NAVSEA | 22 | 1421 | 862 | 301 | (1,120) |
| JAG | 14 | 426 | 387 | 264 | (162) |
| FSA | 10 | 479 | 415 | 256 | (223) |
| NAVFAC | 4 | 456 | 262 | 248 | (208) |
| NAVAIR | 15 | 648 | 226 | 226 | (422) |
| NAVMETOC | 9 | 273 | 263 | 222 | (51) |
| NCIS | 2 | 160 | 208 | 208 | 48 |
| ONR | 1 | 270 | 275 | 200 | (70) |
| MINEWARCOM | 6 | 1,280 | 122 | 122 | (1,158) |
| NAVSOUTH | 4 | 33 | 136 | 46 | 13 |
| NWDC | 3 | 26 | 72 | 26 | 0 |
| AAUSH | 4 | 61 | 31 | 22 | (39) |
| Totals: | 664 | 78,838 | 71,335 | 62,820 | (16,018) |


were few gaps in mission coverage. Given the option of cutting civilians or active duty personnel, apparently, NAVSEA elected to reduce SELRES strength. The NR Engineering Duty Officers program is working a surge shipyard proposal that may result in an add-back of personnel.

- o JAG – Judge Advocate – reduction of nonmilitary essential billets mostly on the enlisted side. The lawyers successfully argued, and received, an add-back from Fleet Forces Command that Naval Reserve lawyers bring unique skills and specialties that serve the Navy’s interest quite well.

- o MINEWARCOM – Mine Warfare – because of poor readiness of mine helicopters and mine warfare ships and

(RC Only)

- **NAVELSF** (decrease 678 RC billets: 24%)
 - Flag-level review (NAVSUP, OPNAV N41, NAVELSF)
 - Savings plus deployability (OIF)
 - Major savings: reduction to 9 NCHBs
- **C2F/C3F** (decrease 463 RC billets: 30%)
 - Coordinated C2F/C3F Flag-level effort
 - Revised RC billet structures are nearly uniform across the two fleets
 - Reduction in number of CSGs with RC support and number of RC billets per CSG
- **NAVEUR** (decrease 139 RC billets: 18%)
 - Coordinated with ongoing CNE transformation
 - Major savings: elimination of RC at AIMU Rota & AIMD Keflavik



deployment requirements, it was decided to make these 100 percent active duty units – regulars and FTS. Again, no room for SELRES. The same is true of the NRF frigates – 100 percent active and no SELRES because they are deployers. Again, changes were made for warfighting readiness purposes.

- IBU – Inshore Boat Units – to meet increasing demands, two entirely active duty units were created with the commensurate loss in SELRES billets.

- CONUS based staffs – a large reduction because the advance of technology improves the efficiency of those doing the jobs full-time. These staffs were found to have grown astronomically over the last twenty years.

- EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal – no cuts. Diving & Salvage lost billets because of military essential and contracting out decisions.

- Carrier Augment Units – large reductions but units comprised of the flight deck ratings remain for surge operations.

The following observations were passed to CNO:

- (1) Existing RC structure based on cold-war missions;

- (2) ZBR recommendations are based on new (post 9/11) DoD guidance;

- (3) ADT/ADSW discretionary funding may provide better value than creating RC billets;

- (4) ZBR effort was challenged by current Navy manpower-analysis capability; and,

- (5) Many MFTs and ROC/POEs are out-of-date. [MFTs are mission, function, task statements for the shore establishment. ROC is required operational capability, and POE is projected operational capability – manpower terms used in TFMMS (Total Force Manpower Management System)].

Our take on (3) is that it might be more cost-effective to use the same Reservist more often than it would be to bring on a second or third Reservist with all the overhead costs to accomplish the task – works in peacetime, not necessarily in wartime; and, on (4) is that they were challenged by the lack of manpower-analysis capability in the Navy today.

Some of the outcomes make sense. But others make us think that the Navy is living for today and not thinking about a larger war that would require trained Selected Reservists for surge and sustainment. Trained Selected Reservists are on call to meet the Navy's needs – always have been. It is very shortsighted not to capture the skills and experience of active duty personnel in meaningful and relevant ways as they leave active duty. It is not hard for me to imagine situations onboard the eight Reserve frigates or the 15 mine countermeasure ships that might require replacement of personnel. Instead of ripping Sailors from another ship and destroying its

readiness, much less bust the PERSTEMPO of the individuals, a trained cadre of Selected Reservists could answer the call in the least disruptive way. This is something that is occurring today, so why isn't it factored into this ZBR? The airline industry today has trimmed its personnel to the minimum, and cancelled flights have become the norm when a single crewmember becomes unavailable. The Navy needs a trained reserve to ensure that it can surge and answer all bells.

A copy of the briefing to CNO (obtained from Pentagon sources) can be found on our Web site at <<http://www.navy-reserve.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=2101>>. As always, we'd be interested in what you readers tell us. ↓